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GAP BETWEEN COUNTRY CULTURE AND DIVERSITY REGULATION 
Abstract 
There is an extensive debate concerning the application of gender quotas on corporate 
boards around the world. Since Norway legislated quotas of female directors in 2003, many 
countries have incorporated some form of legislation about board gender diversity, either as 
good practice to follow or by imposing mandatory quotas. This debate, which is particularly 
intense in Europe, is also on the agenda of countries like Nigeria, India, and Malaysia. 
Based on institutional theory, this study outlines and compares countries that have 
introduced board gender diversity legislation. Results show common denominators and gaps 







There is an extensive debate concerning the application of gender quotas in corporate 
boards of directors around the world. Since Norway adopted in 2003 its legislation to establish a 
40% quota of women directors on corporate boards by 2008, many countries have incorporated 
some form of legislation about BGD, either in their codes of good governance  (Sweden, in 
2004, and Spain, in 2006, were ones of the pioneers) or by imposing mandatory quotas in state-
owned institutions (Finland in 2005; Austria, 2009; Denmark, 2010, Greece, 2013, Portugal, 
2012) or publicly traded firms (Iceland, in 2010; France, Italy and Belgium in 2011, Germany in 
2015). This debate, which is particularly intense in Europe (Reding, 2012), also affects other 
countries like Malaysia in 2004; Kenya, 2010; or India in 2013, which introduced some form of 
quota on boards, or Nigeria in 2012, who recommended a minimum of 30% women directors1 
(See Table 1).  
There are important differences in the percentages of women on corporate boards 
across the world (Catalyst, 2013, 2016, European Commission, 2013; 2015; Adams & 
Kirchmeier, 2013). Table 1 shows that in our international sample, Norway is the country with 
the highest level of BGD (36,96%), followed by Kenya and Finland (26,6%), Sweden (25,3%) 
and France (21,63%). Countries with the least levels of BGD are the United Arab-Emirates 
(1%), Japan (2,62%), Chile (4,3%), Brazil (5,25%), Argentina (5,36%) and Mexico (5,9%).  
According to several authors, (Terjesen & Singh, 2008; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; 
Carrasco, Laffarga & Ruíz-Barbadillo, 2011; Carrasco, Francoeur, Labelle, Laffarga & Ruíz-
Barbadillo, 2015; Grosvold, Rayton & Brammer, 2015), these differences in BGD are mostly 
influenced by the country’s institutional environments. Research has shown that it is the national 
                                                        




culture that is the most important institutional factor associated with BGD (Grosvold & Brammer, 
2011; Adams & Kirchmeier, 2013; Carrasco et al, 2015).  The national culture determines the 
set of beliefs and values that are shared by the citizens of a country (Hofstede, 1980). These 
shared beliefs can specifically influence many social processes and engender the creation of 
stereotypes and roles associated with gender. In turn, these stereotypes might condition the 
professional progress of women. There are important differences between the culture of 
different countries (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1992; Ingleharts, 1977, 2001; Tropenaars, 1993; 
House, Hanges, Javidan; Dorfman & Gupta, 2004), and as supports institutional theory, these 
cultural differences are the basis for the differences in corporate governance structures across 
countries in the world (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin, Lane & Collin, 2007).  
The state of national welfare (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006) also plays a major role in 
determining women´s labor market participation and occupational opportunites (Mendel & 
Semyonov, 2006; Grosvold et al. 2015; Terjesen et al. 2015). The global gender gap index 
provides country rankings and scoring of BGD that allow for effective comparisons across 
countries in four key areas: health, education, economy and politics (WEF, 2014). 
In this study, we hypothesized that the growing trend of legislation on board gender 
quotas is engendered by corporate mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). This 
mimetic isomorphism involves strong cultural changes and difficulties of compliance with 
established policies, caused by the decoupling or conflict between the rules formally established 
and the prevailing cultural values. 
Based on institutional theory, this study outlines and compares a group of countries that 
have introduced BGD legislation. Results show common denominators and gaps between 




This paper is divided in four sections. First, we introduce the objective and motivation of 
the study. The second section describes the theoretical framework. The third section presents 
the sample and methodology. In the last two sections we discuss the results and conclude. 
Mimetic isomorphism  
The concept of mimetic isomorphism was first used by Meyer & Rowan (1997) to explain 
the adaptation of organizations to their environment. Organizations incorporate best practices to 
preserve their legitimacy towards their stakeholders and society in general. This leads firms to 
mimick other organizations that are perceived as legitimate regardless of the real effectiveness 
and efficiency of the practices and procedures they adopt. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) indicate 
that this is only a short-term movement to achieve survival.  According to Seo & Creed (2002), 
in the long term, this type of movement can end up decreasing the capacity for adaptability.  
But, conforming to a set of rules of a particular sector can cause conflicts or inconsistencies with 
the firm’s culture and established practices. Practices that may be appropriate for the objectives 
and institutional characteristics of a particular country, may not be suitable for other countries 
because of divergent interests (Seo & Creed, 2002) 
The success of established practices requires that various institutional mechanisms be 
coupled: regulatory mechanisms (authority that imposes rules limiting or coercing the 
behaviour), normative mechanisms (norms that produce conformity) and cognitive-cultural 
mechanisms (shared conceptions, symbols and cultural rules, which constitute the social nature 
of reality) (Scott, 2001). Zuker (1977) and Lawrence & Suddaby (2006) highlight that the last 
mechanisms, culture, is persistent and resistant to change, which may lead to a decoupling. 
When the established practices are questioned and one or more of these mechanisms are 
misaligned or uncoupled an anomaly or conflict takes place, making success difficult (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009)  
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Based on the work of Di Magio & Powell (1983), we argue that the reason why several 
countries have chosen to impose BGD quotas is mainly due to strategic competitive purposes.  
Sample and Methodology  
Our sample was extracted from the 2014 gender map website provided by Data 
Morphosis2. It covers 14,530 public companies from 43 countries. These companies operate in 
ten sectors or industries and represent all continents of the world. 
Several authors have proposed various cultural dimensions or values to explain cultural 
differences between countries. The first set of dimensions was the one proposed by Hofstede in 
1980.  Work on cultural values by Schwartz (1992), Ingleharts (1977, 2001), Trompenaars 
(1993), House et al., (2004) and Hofstede (2010) have followed to further develop the concept 
of cultural dimensions. Cultural traits do change over time, but cultural changes tend to be 
global, affect every all countries, therefore their relative positions are deemed to remain the 
same or change very slowly (Hofstede, 2010). As pointed out by Robbins (2004), over the years 
the Hofstede cultural dimensions have became the basic theoretical framework to differentiate 
national cultures.  
According to Hofstede, cultural differences explain why different countries respond in 
different ways to the same social phenomenon. Hofstede identified, four cultural dimensions that 
were deemed to determine a country's culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism-collectivism, and masculinity3. Table 2 shows the scores of these dimensions 
                                                        
2 http://two-n.com/gendermap/#/economy/market/European-Union/country/Austria 
3 Power Distance (PD) expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a society 
accept and expect that power is distributed unequality. People in societies exhibiting a large 
degree of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order in which every body has a place and which 
needs no further justification. In societies with low Power Distance, people strive to equalise the 
distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power. 
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across countries along with their definitions. 
The global gender gap Index we use in this study measures one important aspect of 
gender equality, the relative gaps between women and men across four key areas: health, 
education, economy and politics (WEF, 2014). The Index is constructed to rank and score 
countries on their gender gaps rather than their development level or women´s empowerment. 
This index is composed of four subindex: Economic Participation and Opportunity (EPO) (the 
participation gap, the remuneration gap and the advancement gap); Educational Attainment 
(EA); Health and Survival (HS) (sex ratio at birth and gap healthy life expectancy) and Political 
Empowerment (PE) (in minister level and parliamentary positions; and years in executive 
office)4 Table 2 shows the global gender gap index and the subindex for every country of the 
sample. GDPpc5 is as a basic index of general welfare state of the country. The welfare state 
                                                        
Individualism (IND) is defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which 
individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. Its 
opposite, collectivism, represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which 
individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty.  
Masculinity (MAS) represents a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness 
and material rewards for success.. Its opposite, femininity, stands for a preference for 
cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life. 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) expresses the degree to which the members of a society feel 
uncomfotable with uncertainty and ambiguity. The fundamental issue here ir how a society deals 
with the fact that the future can never be known. Countries exhibiting strong UA maintain rigid 
codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas.Weak UA 
societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practices counts more than principles. 
(https://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html 
Two other dimensions were added afterwards in 1991 and 2010, namely the citizens’ attitudes 
regarding long term orientation and the level of indulgence as opposed to restraint. These two 
dimensions have not been used in our work.  
4 http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2014/ 
5  GDPpc is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power 




plays a major role in determining women´s labor market participation and occupational 
opportunities (Mendel & Semyonov, 2006, Grosvold et al. 2015 and Terjesen et al. 2015). 
Every country has a different corporate governance system and legislates GDB 
differently in terms of recommendations, goals, quotas for non-executive directors, and quotas 
for all directors. The literature differentiates between countries without rules, countries with soft 
rules and countries with hard rules (Seierstad, Warner-Soderholm, Torchia & Huse, 2015; 
Terjesen et al, 2015; Terjesen & Sealy, 2016). In our study we identify with "0", the countries 
that do not have regulation in the subject, nor express recommendation in the codes of good 
governments, nor specific objectives; “1” (Code) to countries that recommend in their Code of 
good governance some form of promoting parity in boards of directors; “2” (Code/Target) to 
those that in addition established some type of regulation or target without express sanctions in 
case of non-compliance; “3“ (Soft quota) to those that require quotas with sanctions to state-
owned companies; “4” (Hard quota) to those that have established some form of quotas for all 
companies listed with sanctions. Table 1 shows the different types of BGD regulations adopted 
by the 43 countries in our sample. 
In order to verify our hypothesis, we use a statistical approach that allows us to 
associate countries according to three institutional variables, namely national culture gender 
gap and general welfare. We use a Multiple Correspondence Analysis approach. It is a 
statistical technique that constructs a cartesian diagram based on the association between 
variables. This diagram maps the countries according to the proximity between the 
characteristics of each country. The output allows to visualize in an exploratory and descriptive 
way how the observed variables support the formulated hypothesis. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows the level of BGD and type of regulations in place for every country of our 
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sample.  Figure 1 and 2 provide a quick snapshot of these metrics on world map.  
The Nordic countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden) and France are the European countries 
most diverse. We highlight others countries as Kenya, that is the second in diversity (26,6%), 
and South Africa, the seventh without quotas (16,9%). Malaysia and India highlight for their 
regulation in quota, although the percentage of diversity of these countries are lower (10,78 and 
6,12%).  
Table 2 shows the cultural values, gender gap indixes and the GDPpc of the countries in 
the sample. We highlight Kenya, which represents the lowest GDPpc (2.151 $) followed by India 
and Nigeria (5.050; 5.440 $), the power distance (PD) and the masculinity (MASC) of Kenya are 
very high (70 and 60) while the gap gender Political Empowerment (PE) score is low (0,20). 
Norway is ones of the highest GDPpc (62.858 $), the score of distance in MAS is lower (8) and 
in PD 31, the score on Gender Gap is the second highest (0,84). Finland has the highest (0,85), 
Sweden 0,82 and Denmark 0,80. In theses countries the GDPpc are high (38.000-41.840) and 
scores in MAS and PD low. France, Italy and Belgium have scores in MAS and PD higher than 
Nordics Countries, the GDPpc are 39.494 $ in Belgium, 36.085 in France and 33.715 in Italy.  
The cultural dimensions values, gender gap subindex and GDPpc scores of countries 
are associated with a Multiple Correspondence Analysis. The objective is to create a map of the 
relative position of each country, reflecting the degree of association among the variables under 
study. It reduces the variables in two dimensions (figure 3)6. Dimension 1, the horizontal axis, 
represents mainly the cultural variables PD (30%) and IND (24%). The gender gap PE (14%) 
and GDPpc (19%) are also significant in this dimension (Table 3). In Dimension 2, the vertical 
                                                        
6 We could use four dimensions in a multidimensional space, which would explain 90%, or three 
dimensions, would explain 80%, but the groups of countries in these space are very similar that 
the figure 3. 
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axis, MAS (62,47%) and UA (26,99%) are the main variables. In this map, the variables are 
shown in red colour and the countries with the type of regulation (0 to 4) in blue colour.  
The map (Figure 3) show that the Nordic countries are grouped on the far right side, their 
cultural characteristics, low score in MAS and PD, high in PE and EPO, in addition to a high 
GDPpc, allow them to achieve parity quotas with greater efficiency than others countries. The 
imposition of quotas accelerates change, as has happened in Norway, but being countries with 
good social policies towards equality, compliance with these quotas becomes much more 
feasible and effective. Sweden, a country in which no quotas have been established, has one of 
the highest percentages on diversity.  
The second grouping of countries that we highlight, located in the centre, is the 
European countries that have established quotas, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy along 
with other countries such as Spain and Austria. These countries present different characteristics 
to the previous ones, scores higher in MAS and PD, and PE, EPO, and GDPpc lower than the 
previous ones. Due to their characteristics, quota in boards will be more difficult to assume. The 
cultural traditional of these countries has led to women being left out of top decision-making 
positions, but, they have the strands towards equal policies, that can enforce with the quotas. In 
our opinion, these are the countries that really need regulation to achieve parity. The imposition 
of quotas could be a way to change, initially perhaps only formally but in the medium or long 
term could be effectively. 
The third group of countries to highlight is located to the left of the maps: Nigeria, Kenya, 
Malaysia and India, for pointing out those countries that have established some type of quotas. 
The characteristics of these countries, with low GDPpc, high scores in MAS and PD, as well as 
lower score in PE leads us to ask for the effectiveness of compliance with established quotas. 
India imposed in 2013, one woman on the boards of directors by 2015, is the country with one 
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of the less gender gap score (0,64) and GDPpc. India has the lowest score in EA Gender Gap 
(0,85) and HS (0,93); the score of PD cultural value is higher (77). The compliance in India of a 
woman at least on the boards seems to be fulfilled with the wife of the CEO (Bhalla, 2015; BBC, 
2015).  
In these countries there is a mismatch between their culture, social policies towards 
equality, and regulation in diversity on board established. Compliance with quotas could be 
possible by sanctions for non-compliance. But the effective participation of the woman in the top 
positions on decision-making will be difficult. One way to legitimize institutional change is to do it 
formally, but to continue with the old behaviour (Dougherty & Heller, 1994).  
Conclusions 
Our results show that board gender quotas tend to be adopted by countries based on 
mimetism and legitimacy objectives rather than efficiency and effectiveness. This mimetic 
isomorphism in board gender quotas causes a decoupling between cultural factors and 
regulation that leads us to ask its effectiveness in some countries such as Kenya, Malaysia, 
India or Nigeria. They would require strong cultural changes and social and economic policies to 
bring about effective participation of women.  
In other countries such as the Nordic countries, which are more egalitarian and have 
strong social and economic policies that help the professional development of women, quotas 
could accelerate change, but their own idiosyncrasies and culture accept a rapid and effective 
change. 
In certain countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and even Spain, the 
cultural traditional characteristics of these countries has led to women being left out of top 
decision-making positions, but, they have the strands towards equal policies, that can enforce 
12 
 
with the regulation. Quotas seem perhaps necessary to accelerate the change and achieve 
parity in a short period of time.   
In some of theses countries the effectiveness of the regulation could also be conflictive 
because quotas are not well received by listed companies. A study on this efficiency will be our 
next aim. 
Limitations 
The results and conclusions obtained in our study are valid for the sample studied. We 
have not considered countries such as the Eastern Europe, countries that have a great diversity 
in their boards of directors without having introduced a strong regulation. The percentages 
obtained correspond to the year 2014, some of the initiatives and regulations established in the 
different countries were in the process of compliance (Italy, India and the United Kingdom for 
2015) or had not yet established regulation (Germany in 2015 by 2016), which may explain the 
low percentage obtained in some countries. These limitations and the impossibility to deepen in 
each of the countries of the sample and in many others is what leads us to emphasize the 
subject treated as an open field for research in which, due to its multidisciplinary character, 
acquires special interest. 
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Board Gender Diversity Regulations  
 
COUNTRY ACR %WD 2014 Q QUOTA Year SO LC %Q ED NED 
Norway  NOR 36,96 4 Hard quota 2003 Y Y 40% 2006/08   
Kenya    KEN 26,63 3 Soft quota 2010 Y N 33%   
Finland   FIN 26,61 3 Soft quota 2005 Y N 40% Y Y 
Sweden  SWE 25,3 1 Code 2004      
France  FRA 21,63 4 Hard quota 2011 Y Y 40% N Y 
New Zealand  NZL 17,11 3 Soft quota 2015 Y     
South Africa ZAF 16,93 1 Code 2002      
Israel ISR 16,9 3 Soft quota 2007 Y WDws 50% 2010   
Italy ITA 16,64 4 Hard quota 2011 Y Y 33% Y Y 
Denmark DNK 16,24 2 Code /Target 2012 Y Y  Y Y 
Nigeria NGA 16,2 2 Code /Target 2011      
Belgium BEL 15,36 4 Hard quota 2011 Y Y 33%   
Netherlands NLD 12,76 2 Code /Target 2011 Y Y 30% Y Y 
Poland POL 11,91 1 Code 2015      
Spain ESP 11,81 2 Code/ Target 2007/15 Y Y 40%/30% N Y 
Colombia COL 11,07 1 Code       
Malaysia MYS 10,78 4 Hard quota 2004 / 11 Y Y 30% 2016   
Ireland IRK 10,08 1 Code 2013      
China CHN 9,98 0        
Thailand THA 9,95 0        
United 
Kingdon GBR 9,88 2 Code /Target 2011   25% 2015   
Germany DEU 9,82 4 Hard quota 2015 Y Y 40% 2016 N Y 
Indonesia IDN 9,77 0        
Australia AUS 9,66 2 Code /Target 2010/ 14 Y Y 30% 2017   
Austria AUT 9,37 3 Soft quota 2009 Y   N Y 
Switzerland CHE 9,3 1 Code 2014      
United Stated USA 9,25 1 Code 2013      
Portugal PRT 9,01 3 Soft quota 2012 Y     
Greece GRC 8,69 3 Soft quota 2013 Y   Y Y 
Luxembourg LUX 8,59 1 Code 2009      
Canada CAN 8,4 2 Code /Target 2014      
Singapore SGP 8,29 1 Code 2012      
Russian RUS 8,16 0        
Egypt EGY 7,98 0        
Turkey TUR 7,19 0        
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Philippines PHL 6,97 0        
India IND 6,12 4 Hard quota 2013 Y Y 1WD/2015   
Mexico MEX 5,93 0        
Argentian ARG 5,36 0        
Brazil BRA 5,25 2 Code /Target 2016 Y     
Chile CHL 4,36 0        
Japan JPN 2,62 1 Code 2015 Y Y 30%2020 Y  
United Arab 
Emirates ARE 0,96 0        
WD: Women Director; SO: State owner company; LC: Limited company; %Q: % quota, target; ED: Executive 






Scores cultural dimensions; Gender Gap Indexes; GDPpc 
 
COUNTRY 



















Norway  NOR 31 69 8 50 0,84 0,84 1,00 0,97 0,54 62,858 
Kenya    KEN 70 25 60 50 0,73 0,81 0,92 0,97 0,20 2,151 
Finland   FIN 33 63 26 59 0,85 0,79 1,00 0,98 0,62 38,047 
Sweden  SWE 31 71 5 29 0,82 0,80 1,00 0,97 0,50 41,840 
France  FRA 68 71 43 86 0,76 0,70 1,00 0,98 0,35 36,085 
New Zealand  NZL 22 79 58 49 0,78 0,75 1,00 0,97 0,39 32,240 
South Africa ZAF 49 65 63 49 0,75 0,65 0,99 0,98 0,40 12,042 
Israel ISR 13 54 47 81 0,7 0,64 1,00 0,97 0,20 30,600 
Italy ITA 50 76 70 75 0,7 0,57 0,99 0,97 0,25 33,715 
Denmark DNK 18 74 16 23 0,80 0,80 1,00 0,97 0,43 41,524 
Nigeria NGA 80 30 60 55 0,64 0,71 0,78 0,97 0,11 5,440 
Belgium BEL 65 75 54 94 0,78 0,76 0,99 0,98 0,40 39,494 
Netherlands NLD 38 80 14 53 0,77 0,71 1,00 0,97 0,41 42,453 
Poland POL 68 60 64 93 0,70 0,68 1,00 0,98 0,16 22,162 
Spain ESP 57 51 42 86 0,73 0,65 1,00 0,97 0,31 31,198 
Colombia COL 67 13 64 80 0,71 0,71 1,00 0,98 0,16 11,637 
Malaysia MYS 100 26 50 36 0,65 0,62 0,97 0,97 0,05 21,897 
Ireland IRL 28 70 68 35 0,78 0,75 1,00 0,97 0,41 42,919 
China CHN 80 20 66 30 0,68 0,66 0,99 0,94 0,15 10,756 
Thailand THA 64 20 34 64 0,70 0,77 0,99 0,98 0,07 13,736 
United 
Kingdon GBR 35 89 66 35 0,74 0,71 1,00 0,97 0,27 34,658 
Germany DEU 35 67 66 65 0,78 0,74 1,00 0,97 0,40 41,966 
Indonesia IND 78 14 46 48 0,67 0,60 0,99 0,98 0,13 8,855 
Australia AUS 36 90 61 51 0,74 0,80 1,00 0,97 0,19 42,448 
Austria AUT 11 55 79 70 0,73 0,67 1,00 0,98 0,26 43,139 
Switzerland CHE 34 68 70 58 0,78 0,78 0,99 0,97 0,37 51,293 
United Stated USA 40 91 62 46 0,75 0,83 1,00 0,98 0,19 50,866 
Portugal PRT 63 27 31 99 0,72 0,72 0,99 0,97 0,21 25,095 
Greece GRC 60 35 57 100 0,68 0,64 1,00 0,98 0,10 25,229 
Luxembourg LUX 40 60 50 70 0,73 0,75 1,00 0,97 0,21 86,587 
Canada CAN 39 80 52 48 0,75 0,79 1,00 0,97 0,22 41,541 
Singapore SGP 74 20 48 8 0,70 0,79 0,94 0,97 0,12 74,609 
Russian RUS 93 39 36 98 0,69 0,73 1,00 0,98 0,07 23,310 
Egypt EGY 70 25 45 80 0,61 0,46 0,95 0,98 0,04 10,685 
Turkey TUR 66 37 45 85 0,62 0,45 0,95 0,98 0,09 18,148 
Philippines PHL 94 32 64 44 0,78 0,78 1,00 0,98 0,37 6,005 
India IND 77 48 56 40 0,65 0,41 0,85 0,94 0,39 5,050 
Mexico MEX 81 30 69 82 0,69 0,55 0,99 0,98 0,24 16,316 
Argentina AEG 49 46 56 86 0,73 0,63 1,00 0,98 0,32 9,275 
Brazil BRA 69 38 49 76 0,69 0,65 1,00 0,98 0,15 14,323 
20 
 
Chile CHL 63 23 28 86 0,70 0,55 1,00 0,98 0,26 21,049 
Japan JPN 54 46 95 92 0,66 0,62 0,98 0,98 0,06 34,882 
United Arab 
Emirates ARE 90 25 50 80 0,64 0,51 0,99 0,96 0,11 57,045 
PD: Power Distance; IND: Individualism; MAS: Masculinity; UA: Uncertainty Avoidance; Sc: Global Gender Gap Score: 
GGEPO: Economic Participation and Opportunity; EA: Educational Attainment; HS: Health and Survival; PE: Political 
Empowerment; GDPpc: Gross domestic product per capita converted to international dollars using purchasing power 
parity rates. 
Table 3 
Results of Correspondence Analysis 
  Eigenvalue percentage of variance cumulative percentage of variance 
Dim 1  0,050 49,56 49,56 
Dim 2 0,014 12,59 62,15 
    
Contribution Dim 1 
 
Dim 2  
H1 PD    (-)  30,29 0,52  
H2 IND    (+)  24,62 3,67  
H3 MAS         3,58 (-)  62,47  
H4 UA   7,40 (+) 26,99  
GG EPO   0,76 0,02  
GG EA 0,10 0,26  
GG HS    0,37 0,05  
GG PE   (+)  14,09 4,71  
GDPpc    (+)  18,79 1,29  
PD: Power Distance; IND: Individualism; MAS: Masculinity; UA: Uncertainty Avoidance; EPO: Economic Participation 
and Opportunity; EA: Educational Attainment; HS: Health and Survival; PE: Political Empowerment; GDPpc: Gross 

























Figure 3  
Diagram correspondence Analysis  
 
 
 
